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Ambassadors and envoys from Russia to Poland-Lithuania in the years 1763-1794 were among the most important characters in the politics of Poland. Their powers went far beyond the those of most diplomats and can be compared to those of viceroys〔Hamish M. Scott, ''The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756-1775: 1756-1775'', Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-521-79269-X, () Google Print, p.249]〕 in the colonies of Spanish Empire, or Roman Republic's proconsuls in Roman provinces. During most of that period ambassadors and envoys from the Russian Empire, acting on the instructions from Saint Petersburg, held a ''de facto'' position superior to that of the Polish king, Stanisław August Poniatowski. Backed by the presence of the Russian army within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and leveraging the immense wealth of the Russian Empire, they were able to influence both the king and the Polish parliament, the Sejm. According to their demands, the king dispensed the Commonwealth offices among the Russian supporters, and the Sejm, bribed or threatened, voted as the Russians dictated. The agenda of the Permanent Council (Polish government) was edited and approved by the Russian ambassador, and the members of the Council were approved by him. Their power also manifested itself in many aspects of daily life, especially in the Polish capital of Warsaw: for example, a performance in the theatre would be delayed until the Russian ambassador arrived, even if the Polish king himself was present. In another incident, a Russian ambassador who arrived late in the theatre, with the Polish king again present, demanded that the spectacle should be restarted. Eventually this forceful expression of Russian diplomacy, backed by the military might of the Empire, and despite a few setbacks like the Bar Confederation, Constitution of May 3, 1791 and Kościuszko Uprising, achieved its goal of expanding Russian control over most of the Commonwealth territory and population. ==Background (before 1763)== Beginning in the second half of the 18th century, the unique political system of the Commonwealth, the quasi-democratic〔Maciej Janowski, ''Polish Liberal Thought'', Central European University Press, 2001, ISBN 963-9241-18-0, Google Print: (p.3 )〕 Golden Liberty, had turned into anarchy.〔Martin Van Gelderen, Quentin Skinner, ''Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage'', Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-521-80756-5 (Google Print: p.54 )〕 The Polish nobility's (''szlachta'') privilege of ''liberum veto'', first introduced as a safeguard against tyranny of the monarch, allowed any deputy to the Sejm to stop and annul the entire session. This was soon seen by the neighbouring powers - especially Prussia and Russia - as the perfect opportunity to disrupt the Commonwealth from inside, and soon many Sejms were dissolved by a deputy bribed by one of the foreign powers.〔William Bullitt, ''The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs'', Transaction Publishers, 2005, ISBN 1-4128-0490-6, (Google Print, p.42-43 )〕〔John Adams, ''The Political Writings of John Adams'', Regnery Gateway, 2001, ISBN 0-89526-292-4, (Google Print, p.242 )〕 With an impotent Sejm, the Commonwealth stagnated, as it was impossible to reform the government, raise taxes or increase the size of the army. In 1717, Russia cemented its position as the dominant force in Poland, in the aftermath of the Great Northern War and amid the growing likelihood of a civil war in Poland between the Polish king August II the Strong and the Polish nobility. Russian tsar Peter I the Great, posing as the conciliator between the Commonwealth king and the szlachta, ordered units of the Russian army to enter Polish territory - using the treaties of alliance from the Great Northern War - and coerced the Polish Sejm of 1717 into accepting his 'compromise'. During that Sejm (known as the Silent Sejm, as only one person was allowed to speak aloud), laws were passed that not only eliminated the possibility of August strengthening his power, but also ensured by means of restricted taxation (and thus a constrained Polish army) that Poland would not be able to interfere with similar Russian interventions in the future. In reality, if not the letter of the law, the reforms of the Silent Sejm meant that the Commonwealth became a Russian protectorate, and it would be Russian ambassadors and envoys who would be responsible for this territory under the tsar. In 1730 than Russian ambassador to Poland, Karl Gustav von Löwenwolde, was instrumental in the Alliance of the Three Black Eagles (or Löwenwolde's Treaty), an agreement between Commonwealth's neighbours to preserve the dysfunctional state of affairs within it. Russian influence on Poland further increased during the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), when Russian military intervention overturned the result of the royal election of Stanisław Leszczyński.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Ambassadors and envoys from Russia to Poland (1763–1794)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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